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I

Will Business-Led
Environmental
Initiatives Grow in
Agriculture?
,

by Sandra S.
Batie and
David E.
Ervin

This article was stimulated by a 1997 American Agricultural Economics Association annual meeting
preconference designed by Batie and Ervin. The authors felt that there was considerable interest and activity in business-led environmental management (also
caLLed corporate environmental management)-but
most of the interest was found outside of the agricultural sector and the profession. The conference was a
means to investigate the extent, motivation, and consequences of business-led poLLution prevention activities. The DuPont and the StahLbush Island Farms
examples used in this article were drawn from discussions that took place at the conference and which were
published in the proceedings. In the article, the authors draw lessons for agriculture informed by the experiences of nonagricultural businesses. They identify
and distiLL from these experiences the major roles for
the public sector to enable agricultural business-led
initiatives to flourish and to be successful.

onsider the following two real-world cases:
E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Company,
Inc. (DuPont) and Stahlbush Island Farms.
DuPont is now implementing its vision of sustainable growth with a goal of zero emissions and waste.
This commitment has led DuPont to improve efficiency of material use, energy use, and water use;
to recycle; to make safer products and processes;
and to reduce the impact of their total system on
the environment, while creating more value for their
customers and stockholders.
Stahlbush Island Farms decreased synthetic pesticide use by about 85 percent and significantly
reduced synthetic nitrogen fertilizer use over the
last decade, yet raised yields and increased profit.
Simultaneously, surface runoff and groundwater

C

leaching of nutrients and pesticides have declined
under an integrated system of crop rotations, cover
crops, composting, and other soil quality improvements guided by advanced management information systems. Water is used a minimum of three
times in a state-of-the-art food processing system,
and processing waste is composted and returned to
the soil. Stahlbush's sales of organic and other "sustainable agriculture" products now reach markets
in forty states and fourteen countries. The operation was selected as Oregon's "Agricultural Proc.essor of the Year" in 1992.
Both of these cases illustrate business-led initiatives in environmental management; numerous
other cases tell similar stories and may offer a
glimpse of the leading edge of environmental management in agriculture. These initiatives have occurred when many past government agro-environmental programs, despite progress on soil erosion
and wildlife issues, seem to have, at least partially,
failed. No matter how much we fine-tune public
approaches, such as targeting land retirement, their
cost-effectiveness, reach, and longevity are limited
by information and budgets available to program
staff. More lasting remedies to agro-environmental
problems may result if business acumen and incentive were to be harnessed to lessen information and
budget constraints. However, a better understanding of the capacity and limitations of business-led
initiatives is necessary to design the proper balance
of private and public responsibilities.

Business-led environmental initiatives
can work
Business-led environmental initiatives appear to
stem from two main forces: (1) a desire to lower
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costs and improve profits while achieving or exceeding environmental regulatory compliance (i.e.,
compliance-push forces) and/or (2) a desire to respond to consumer demands for more environmentally friendly processes and products (i.e., demandpull forces). In response to the first force (compliance-push), many firms no longer rely on minimal
compliance with environmental regulations and no
longer resist regulatory agencies; rather, they tend
to build relationships with regulators, analyze the
firm's total processes with respect to the environment, and see environmental management as an
essential competitive aspect of their firm 's strategic
approach. Ultimately, these firms perceive pollution as a flaw in their overall product or process
design. As a result, they focus less on pollution
abatement and more on system redesign for pollution prevention.
Some firms motivated by compliance-push
forces, such as DuPont, have also found that the
presumed trade-off between profits and environmental quality does not always apply. Instead, by
innovating and redesigning their products, processes,
corporate culture, and organizational strategy, these
firms have been able to improve environmental performance and add to profits. These improved profits are sometimes referred to as "innovation offsets"
because they result from technological changes to
reduce pollution which also reduce production costs
(and/or improve productivity) and thereby "offset"
the costs of compliance. The necessary technological innovation is pursued when firms take a dynamic investment perspective rather than presume
a static trade-off between profits and environmental quality. Satisfying or exceeding environmental
requirements will also reduce a firm's transaction
costs with the regulatory agency and may pre-empt
tighter standards.
Other firms, such as Stahl bush, in response to
the second force, demand-pull, have found growing markets for so-called "green products" such as
"sustainable agriculture" products. Developments,
such as eco-Iabeling, are underway in several food
and fiber markets, and have permitted consumers
to express their willingness to pay for environmental attributes of a product or its production process. Many of these efforts focus more on "delighting" the firms' customers than on offsetting any
costs of regulatory compliance. However, the end
result can be similar: the firms find profitable ways
of reaching environmental goals.
Will the DuPont and the Stahlbush stories be
replicated throughout the country? Will the next
generation of agro-environm~ntal !l:lanagement be
led by farmers, ranchers, and agri-businesses? Perhaps. But for this change to occur, the appropriate
incentives must be in place. Without these incen-

tives, business actions will tend to protect only some
parts of the environment. For example, in the absence of compliance-push forces, it is difficult to
envision how markets for fisheries in the Chesapeake Bay could induce farmers in Pennsylvania
and Virginia to alter their fertilizer and manure
practices which contribute to nutrient pollution.
There are important and necessary roles for the
public sector in providing the appropriate incentives for business-led environmental management.
These include
• setting clear environmental objectives and granting flexibility to producers to meet these objectives;
• building management skills for operating dynamic,
integrated systems;
• lessening transition costs of adopting the new
production and marketing systems; and
• stimulating research and technology development
for environmental public goods.

Setting clear environmental
objectives and granting flexibility
to producers
Despite over sixty years of conservation and environmental programs for u .S. agriculture, fewagroenvironmental objectives and performance standards
apply. This inattention to specific environmental
targets stands in stark contrast to other industries.
With few exceptions, goals for air, land, and water
quality have been applied to firms in nonagricultural sectors. Controlling the level of sulfur dioxide
and nitrous oxide concentrations to meet human
health criteria in urban airsheds is a prime example.
Such goals and standards are almost absent in
agriculture. Instead, mostly voluntary programs of
education, technical advice, and financial assistance
have been used to entice farmers to adopt technology-based practices or retire land vulnerable to damage. Examples include cost-sharing for the construction of wastewater holding ponds (of adequate size
and specified materials) to control manure discharges from large livestock operations, or rental
payments to temporarily set aside cropland prone
to excessive erosion with the Conservation Reserve
Program. The objectives guiding these programs
have been largely couched in terms of the use of
certain management technologies or in achieving a
given level of land retirement, not in terms of
achieving ambient environmental conditions. Some
direct controls exist, such as restrictions on certain
pesticide use and the drainage or filling of wetlands, but they largely preclude certain practices
rather than aim to achieve particular environmental objectives.
This voluntary-payment approach was born in the
Great Depression when broad public support existed
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to transfer resources to fmancially strapped farmers .
Adroit political power by agricultural interest groups
and a sympathetic public have sustained the approach,
despite the evolution of different environmental manI
agement programs for other sectors.
More than politics has hampered the establishment of explicit objectives and performance standards for agriculture. The science and technology
necessary to identify the causes of water, air, and
land pollution from such a large number of diverse
farm production systems spread over almost half of
the U.S. land base have been slow in developing.
However, considerable progress has been made of
late with the development of geographic information systems and improved understanding of sourcepollution-damage linkages. Major assessments of
agro-environmental linkages have concluded that
information exists to improve the precision of problem identification and better target damage reduction or benefit enhancement as the case may be
(NRC, OTA, USDA-ERS).
There is nothing inherent abour voluntary, incentive-based approaches to suggest that they cannot improve agro-environmental problems. However,
after evaluating several major programs in the United
States and Europe, Davies and Mazurek conclude
that clear, specific, and measurable objectives are crucial to the success of voluntary, incentive-based approaches. The authors stress that there is no way to
Water is used a minimum of three times in Stahlbush's innovative processing system.

avoid the need to legislate improvements in environmental policy. Without the certainty and incentives
provided by those statutes, less than full progress on
the agro-environmental problems should be expected.
However, legislation can ensure that objectives are
established through an open process that includes
the views of all key stakeholders.
There is no doubt that setting and enforcing
broad performance standards will involve considerable cost. But the potential long-term net benefits
for the industry, consumers of environmental services, and taxpayers will otherwise go unrealized.
Furthermore, without performance standards the
resolution of complex issues associated with crossboundary state and national environmental issuessuch as hypoxic conditions in the Gulf of Mexicowill remain elusive. The absence of environmental
objectives and performance standards has profound
implications for the design of business-led environmental initiatives.
Objectives and standards need not equate with
"command and control" regulations that dictate required farming practices. Although there may be
situations where extreme public health risks or
highly toxic pesticides require the use of such regulation, in most cases there are good technical and
economic reasons to avoid "command and control" regulations. In these more usual types of agroenvironmental problems, flexible incentives may
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suffice for agricultural firms to meet environmental
objectives (Batie and Ervin). The term "flexible incentives" refers to environmental management tools
that specify "what" targets are to be achieved, but
allow choices as to responses, or exactly "how" the
targets will be achieved.
Without clear, specific, and measurable objectives, it becomes virtually impossible to implement
a system of flexible incentives. The strength of relying more on business insight, ingenuity, and innovation to fashion low-cost solutions vanishes unless clear signals about the desired direction can be
defined. The lack of clear signals is one reason why
we have seen so little private innovation in solving
agro-environmental problems.

Build management skills for
integrated systems
If more responsibility for achieving market and environmental objectives is shifted to farms and
agribusinesses, the value of management that helps
meet those objectives will rise. More proficient managers will find the lower cost and/or higher-valued
ways of satisfying both objectives.
What public and private institutions are in place
to deliver the needed human capital? The Extension
system has far fewer people than in earlier times and
is perceived by many to be incapable of educating
about frontier production and marketing opportunities in many areas. Recognizing the limits of Extension resources, what can government agency education and technical assistance programs for conservation and environmental management, such as those
of the Natural Resources Conservation Service
(NRCS), accomplish? Their strength has arguably
been in technology and practices rather than management, although recent NRCS reforms have encouraged more attention to management skills.
Private advisory fums increasingly provide joint
production and environmental management services
that augment the operator's capacity to achieve the
dual objectives. These private firms may well enjoy a
comparative advantage over their public counterparts
in supplying the specific human capital necessary to
meet environmental requirements and to discover
profitable green markets for specific farms and their
unique human and natural resources. However, there
is a paucity of accessible education and accreditation
programs for private advisors. Furthermore, it is difficult for producers to judge the skills and advice
from these advisors-suggesting a possible role for
public institutions to accredit private advisors.

Reduce transition costs
Firms that redesign their production and marketing systems to improve economi y apd . ~nvironmen
tal performances incur transition costs. These ex-

penses may include obtaining access to valid and
useful knowledge, short-run reductions in productiviry until the system is refined, installation of new
equipment, acquisition of management expertise,
and other requirements. For example, some Florida
dairy farmers, forced to meet tighter phosphorus
emission standards, invested large sums in new production facilities that eventually improved productivity and lowered emissions (Boggess, Johns, and
Meline). DuPont's "Zero Discharge" program led
to systems re-engineering which increased shortrun costs but ultimately enhanced long-run profits
via more efficient input use and new products made
from recycled wastes. Stahl bush Island Farms' tenyear investment in switching from conventional to
sustainable production systems has been rewarded
by increased profits.
Two themes run through these case stories:
1. The shifts in production and marketing systems
start with substantial investments in human,
physical, and/or environmental capital.
2. Learning and adaptive management can substantially influence the trajectories of costs and returns.
These themes imply that the appropriate economic model to understand such stories is dynamic,
with uncertain costs and returns that can be shifted
down and up through learning. Economic analyses
of environmental management systems often adopt
static models and fixed costs and returns. Such static
analyses can be misleading, because they do not
account for learning that pushes the production
and marketing frontiers out or that pulls per unit
costs down. The cases mentioned above could well
have been judged unprofitable or with excessive
risk from the short-run perspective when, instead,
they have apparently led simultaneously to more
economically viable and environmentally beneficial
operations. Costs were incurred in making the transition, as for any investment, but the longer-run
returns have tended to outweigh those expenses.
No doubt many of the more visible cases such
as Stahlbush Island Farms include top managers
and therefore are not reflective of all operators. Thus
the question becomes, How can the transition costs
be lowered so that shifts to more profitable and
more environmentally valuable production and marketing systems be accelerated and more broadly pursued? The rationale for enhancing adoption above
the rate that private markets would generate is based
on the public good benefits of many environmental improvements.
While no single solution will apply to all situations, at least two strategies can be envisioned. The
first would offer education and technical assistance
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to upgrade operators' and advisors' skills for dealing with the dynamic and uncertain situations. An
example may be conducting training workshops in
integrated pest management for producers and consultants to lower the perceived risks of reducing
pesticide applications. Unfortunately, the public institutions for delivering such training, such as Extension and NRCS, have either suffered declining
fortunes of late or have focused more on technologies than on management training.
A second strategy could be pursued when education and technical assistance will not lower transition expense sufficiently, but the environmental
public goods warrant some subsidy to induce wider
use. This approach may be appropriate when upfront capital investments are necessary to shift production-operations such as installing fencing and
watering facilities for rotational grazing systems that
lower confined animal waste disposal problems but
ultimately are profitable. For the second strategy,
the newly created federal Environmental Quality
Incentives Program (EQIP) appears well positioned
to fIll this need, but, to date, EQIP has lirtle track
record that it is serving this role.
For such subsidies to be meaningful, however,
the activities funded must emanate from a whole
farm plan that includes an environmental audit to
discern which of the farm or firm production operations and procedures is creating agro-environmental problems. Such an audit may require the
assistance of outside experts and should address key
environmental performance areas such as the treatment and disposal of manure, emissions of dust to
air, runoff to surface water, leaching to groundwater, energy use, noise, odors, resource depletion (water, soil, and habitat)-all across time and across
space. Without such an audit, redesign of the farm
system will probably not be as successful in achieving environmental goals as is possible and profitable. Using EQIP or other subsidies to support
stand-alone technologies without the underpinning
of a well-designed whole-farm plan based on an
environmental audit could shift pollution from one
medium to another or easily revert to merely "business as usual. " "Business as usual" has not resulted
in enough environmental quality improvement to
be considered a "solution. "

Stimulate research and
technology development
One of the most underappreciated strategies to
achieve lasting progress on agro-environmental objectives through business initiatives is research and
development (R&D) policy. Arguably, the path of
agriculture during the twentietljl century has been
influenced more by research and technology breakthroughs than by any other forces. First came

mechanization, then the discovery of hybrid seeds,
then the introduction of synthetic fertilizers and
pesticides, and then biotechnology advances. Now,
information management systems made possible by
advanced electronic data-processing technology
could permeate the agricultural landscape if their
benefits rise or their costs fall sufficiently.
Basic discoveries and applied advances from both
the public and private research systems have played
key roles. Economic forces either pushed or pulled
many of these technologies, a phenomenon explained by the theory of induced innovation. Under the induced innovation theory, R&D suppliers, whether public or private, respond to rising
relative input prices, such as for land and water, by
developing less-expensive substitutes that economize
on the use of the more-expensive inputs. Examples
include the development of pesticides to raise yields
and substitute for more extensive use of land, and
the evolution to more efficient irrigation technologies as the nonfarm competition for water drives
water prices higher. The signals to innovate new
technologies works most directly through private
markets as suppliers work to capture the producer's
willingness to pay for cost savings. However, the
messages also reach the public agricultural research
system as producers lobby government and university research administrators to help them respond
to market opportunities or defend against unfavorable price and cost swings.
There are two reasons to doubt that agricultural
R&D has been fully responsive to environmental
management issues. First, incomplete or nonexist-·
ent markets for many environmental services hamper the effectiveness of price incentives to stimulate
either private or public R&D. The missing markets for environmental services, such as clean water, cause external benefits that are not captured or
external costs that are not paid by the sellers and
buyers of agricultural products. Second, current
agro-environmental programs rely largely on costsharing payments for existing technologies or best
management practices (BMPs), an approach that
does not effectively signal the need for new R&D
(Ervin and Schmitz). Without such signals, the
R&D responses may concentrate on remediation
and pollution control rather than forward-looking
investigations to prevent pollution or excessive natural resource degradation. Where agro-environmental regulations exist, such as for pesticides, both
public and private R&D can be expected to lessen
the costs of those regulations.
Despite the ' imperfections in R&D signals,
"complementary technologies" that simultaneously
enhance environmental conditions and maintain
farm profit are expanding (OTA) . A partial listing
includes conservation tillage, soil nutrient testing,
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integrated pest management, rotational grazing, and
organic production techniques. Others just emerging with unknown potential include precision farming and genetic engineering-both of which may
transform agriculture as we know it.
Unfortunately each emerging complementary
technology will likely fall far short of its potential
under current R&D and agro-environmental policies. Why? Because all serious off-farm environmental effects of agriculture are not effectively internalized in private decisions, such as water pollution from nutrients. Also, voluntary-payment programs subsidize the use of existing technologies
rather than stimulate targeted public or private
R&D. The market and government failures create
the need for agro-environmental policies that do
stimulate appropriate R&D. How can that be accomplished? Primarily by setting clear, measurable
environmental performance objectives and by developing significant incentives that reward progress
toward those objectives.

Lessons for agriculture
In many businesses, we are witnessing a search for
pollution prevention management strategies. These
businesses are motivated by a variety of factors such
as liability concerns, public image, cost-savings, consumer demands, pressure group demands, and the
desire to reduce uncertainty. Businesses so motivated examine their whole production and distribution system with environmental audits, and they
engage in strategies to increase resource productivity, to reduce material requirements, to recycle, and
to "mine" their wastes for valuable products. Indeed, such environmental auditing and system redesign is now so common that it has its own field
of investigation-industrial ecology--that focuses on
resource productivity, materials cycle optimization,
and waste minimization.
What lessons can be drawn for agro-environmental prevention from these businesses' experiences? Based on our research and the businesses'
experiences, four lessons stand out. First, businesses
want and need clear public environmental objectives on which to plan their management strategies. Most will not oppose objectives that are based
on the best science and enjoy strong public support, but they resent moving targets. More than
anything, uncertainty about the environmental objectives stymies business planning and investment
to reaching the objectives cost effectively. Whenever science permits, these objectives should be
specified in terms of environmental outcomes, such
as water quality conditions. Government should
refrain from specifying controls on production
methods and give maximum flexibility to producers to innovate new ways to meet the targets.
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Second, our observations and business testimony
suggest that the most effective pollution prevention strategies require highly proficient managers.
Top managers often find ways of conserving resources, particularly by reducing the water, fertilizers, pesticides, manures, and topsoil that run off or
leach from fields. Hence, public or private investments in upgrading management will likely pay
twin dividends: higher profits and lower pollution.
Moreover, the return on such investments will likely
grow over time as both competitiveness pressures
and environmental standards for farming rise.
Third, implementing state-of-the-art environmental management systems requires investments
in new information/audit systems, plant equipment,
personnel, and, occasionally, marketing systems (to
capitalize on green market opportunities) . Many of
these investment costs can be recouped through
Broccoli harvest at Stahlbush Island Farms, an organic and "sustainable
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cost savings or increased prices. However, it is unlikely that private markets alone will reward enough
producers and in sufficient amounts to make the
kind of progress to reduce large-scale environmental problems desired by the public. Targeted education, technical, and financial assistance are needed
to lower the costs for those cases.
Finally, the fundamental role of agricultural
R&D in building more productive and environmentally protective (integrated) agricultural systems
cannot be overemphasized. The record of the U.S.
agricultural research system in enhancing productivity is the envy of the world. The "public good"
benefit from that research can be expanded by more
attention to environmental objectives. With more
public investment, the cost of new integrated systems will fall, thus spreading their influence across
the countryside.
The lessons from business environmental management can be applied to agro-environmental problems, and there is a role for flexible policy
undergirded by clear environmental objectives in
agriculture. However, there are gaps in information necessary for improved agro-environmental
policy design.
Fortunately, the dynamic to fill these information gaps is created by the very agro-environmental
policies that set clear environmental objectives and
that grant flexibility to producers to meet these
objectives. These same policies will create a demand for the necessary management skills to operate dynamic and integrated systems in decentralized markets and will stimulate research and technology development for environmental public
goods. Still, implementation of a flexible agro-environmental policy may be hampered by information and management skill gaps for specific cases.
As a result, some proxies may need to be used for
exact performance standards (e.g., landscape conditions in lieu of ambient water quality standards)
until information gaps close.
There appear to be strong economic and environmental rationales for designing a new, more flexible environmental policy for agriculture. Neither
the trend of heightened global competition nor the
public's demand for improved environmental quality gives any sign of abating. Indeed, both will likely
intensify. Giving more responsibility and discretion to the private business sector to meet clear
environmental objectives will be a significant departure from past approaches for agriculture. It requires new and different roles for research, education, and technical assistance and government payments to build human capital, innovate new systems, and lessen transition costs to accelerate their
adoption. The end result may well be an agricul-

ture that is both competitive and environmentally
protecting. (jJ
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